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THE SUPREME COURT'S REJECTION OF THE RATIONAL




The Fifteenth Amendment to the Constitution was approved in 1870.1
Quickly after that, Congress authorized the Enforcement Act of 1870,
which made it a crime for public officers and private persons to place un-
due burdens on the right to vote because of race.' In the following year,
the voter enforcement law was revised to arrange for comprehensive fed-
eral administration of the electoral procedure, from registration to the cer-
tification of election returns.' Less than 25 years after the passage of the
voter enforcement law, the enthusiasm for racial equality virtually disap-
peared; as a result, the voting rights laws were not enforced and, for the
most part, their provisions were repealed in 1894. 4 The leftovers of the
1870 Enforcement Act offered very little protection in any renewed battle
against voting discrimination during the 1950s and 1960s.1 On the other
hand, starting in 1890, the Southern States of Alabama, Georgia, Louisi-
ana, Mississippi, North Carolina, South Carolina, and Virginia enacted tests
that were routinely utilized until the 1960s with an explicitly calculated goal
to stop African Americans from voting.6 Normally, the voting suppression
effort required the capacity to read and write to meet the registration quali-
fication and also to demonstrate the competence to complete a registration
form.7 "These laws were based on the fact that as of 1890 in each of the
named States, more than two-thirds of the adult Negroes were illiterate
while less than one-quarter of the adult whites were unable to read or
write."8 During this period, different qualifications were specified in all of
the named States to guarantee that white illiterates would not be denied
the right to vote. These historical "whites only" voter qualifications in-
cluded grandfather clauses and property requirements. 9
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1. S.C. v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301, 310 (1966), abrogated by Shelby Cnty., Ala. v. Holder, 133
S. Ct. 2612 (2013).
2. Id.
3. Id.
4. Id. n.8 (citing 28 Stat. 36).
5. Id.
6. Id.
7. Id. at 310-11.
8. Id. at 311.
9. Id.
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Congress authorized the Voting Rights Act of 1965 ("VRA") as a
comprehensive statute to battle voter discrimination collectively at a na-
tional level and at an individual jurisdiction level.10 The VRA includes per-
manent requirements and temporary stipulations. 1 Section 2 of the VRA
includes permanent stipulations that prohibit denying or abridging an
American citizen's right to vote because of race.12 The temporary condi-
tions, which involve the "preclearance requirement of Section 5" as well as
the coverage formula in Section 4(b), could be renewed continually by
Congress.13 The two temporary provisions of the VRA, Section 4(b) and
Section 5, were challenged in Shelby County.14 Congress utilizes the cover-
age formula of Section 4(b) to decide which jurisdictions are curtailing the
voting rights of their citizens under the VRA and which jurisdictions are
under Section 5's preclearance constraints.' 5 "The coverage formula cov-
ers jurisdictions that (1) used any voting test or device during 1964, 1968, or
1972, and (2) had less than 50% of its citizens either registered to vote or
vote in the 1964, 1968, or 1972 presidential elections."' 6 A reverse judi-
cially-activist Supreme Court under the leadership of Chief Justice Roberts
refused to grant rational basis deference to Congress and allowed the Sec-
tion 4(b) challenge to the coverage formula to succeed.
If Chief Justice Roberts were a true student of Southern culture he
would understand that his decision in Shelby County is not a reasonable
response to that history in the context of the right to vote for African
Americans. Chief Justice Roberts, by concentrating on how much events
and affairs have changed in the South, ignored the advice of William Faulk-
ner, Son of the South. According to William Faulkner, for many
Southerners, "[t]he past is never dead. It's not even past."17 Rather than
punishing the children for the racial profiling and vote-denying sins of their
fathers, Section 5 preclearance should properly be regarded as a rational
and compelling finger-pointing remedy for a historically racially obsessed
Southern society. The Section 5 finger-pointing remedy is needed to target
and deter contemporary concerns about voter suppression in Southern so-
ciety. 8 In those Southern geographic jurisdictions where the past is never
dead, Shelby County may be viewed as a back-to-the-future approach to
race-based voter suppression in the name of sovereign equality. I believe
10. Sudeep Paul, The Voting Rights Act's Fight to Stay Rational: Shelby County v. Holder, 8
DUKE J. CONST. L. & PUB. POL'Y SIDEBAR 271, 273 (2013).
11. Id.
12. Id.
13. Id. (citing U.S. Department of Justice Civil Rights Division Voting Section - Frequently Asked
Questions, THE UNITEO STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, http://www.justice.gov/crt/about/vot/misc/
faq.php (last visited Sept. 30, 2014) ("In 2006, Congress passed the [Fannie Lou Hamer, Rosa Parks,
and Coretta Scott King] Voting Rights and Reauthorization and Amendments Act of 2006 which re-




17. Joel Heller, Faulkner's Voting Rights Act: The Sound and Fury of Section Five, 40 HOFSTRA
L. REV. 929, 933 (quoting WILLIAM FAULKNER, REQUIEM FOR A NUN 92 (1950)).
18. Id.
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Chief Justice Roberts' sovereign equality theory is better known in the
South as states' rights.
The issue to be addressed is whether the Supreme Court in Shelby
County actually rejected rational basis as the standard of review in evaluat-
ing whether Congress exceeded its authority under the Fifteenth Amend-
ment when it reauthorized Section 4(b)'s coverage formula in 2006
pursuant to the VRA of 1965. One of the major goals of the VRA is to
breathe life into the Fifteenth Amendment by introducing effective
preclearance remedies to fight racially inspired voter discrimination.' 9 Sec-
tion 5 of the VRA arms the Attorney General with a preclearance rem-
edy.20 The preclearance remedy allows the Attorney General to evaluate
and approve any voting changes offered by those jurisdictions identified in
Section 4(b)'s coverage formula as historically predisposed to engage in
racial discrimination.2 ' The Attorney General, arguing for the continuing
constitutionality of Section 4(b)'s coverage, correctly asserted that once
Congress adopts a body of law implementing the Fifteenth Amendment's
outlawing of racial discrimination in voting, a reviewing court should apply
the deferential rational basis standard.2 2 Shelby County requested the fed-
eral court to apply the "congruence and proportionality" test.23 Shelby
County made the claim before the district court that the Supreme Court
requires all federal civil rights enforcement legislation to be subjected to a
congruence and proportionality review.2 4 Also, Shelby County insisted
that the Supreme Court specifically rely on the voting rights cases in apply-
ing the congruence and proportionality test. Unfortunately, the federal
district court in Shelby County applied the congruence and proportionality
test. 6
While limiting the role of congressional power under Section 5 of the
Fourteenth Amendment to protect freedom of religion, the Supreme Court
rather conveniently engaged in creativity by requiring "a congruence and
proportionality between the injury to be prevented or remedied and the
means adapted to that end. Lacking such a connection, legislation may
become substantive in operation and effect. History and our case law sup-
port drawing the distinction, one apparent from the text of the Amend-
ment., 27 In the Supreme Court's war against Congress, the Court's
creative congruent and proportional standard grants Congress less power
to choose the conceivable means to enforce the Reconstruction Amend-
ments contained in the Constitution. The Court's war on Congress contin-
ues to expand the Court's far-reaching authority to reject those
19. Paul, supra note 10, at 271-72.
20. Id.
21. Id.





27. City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 520 (1997).
2014]
MISSISSIPPI COLLEGE LAW REVIEW
congressional means provided under the traditional "rational basis" stan-
dard, which is historically used for legislation enforcing constitutional pro-
visions.28 In this article, Part II contends that Shelby County's implicit
abandonment of the rational basis standard represents a substantial
rollback in the power of Congress to protect the right to vote. Part III
maintains that Chief Justice Roberts' application of an equal sovereignty
theory in Shelby County should be rejected. In Part IV, this article declares
thay Shelby County's holding has the practical effect of invalidating the
preclearance concept by killing off the coverage formula, which actually
denies minority voters in covered jurisdictions an effective remedy under
the VRA.
II. SHELBY COUNT-'S IMPLICIT ABANDONMENT OF THE RATIONAL
BASIS STANDARD PRESENTS A SUBSTANTIAL ROLLBACK IN
THE POWER OF CONGRESS TO PROTECT
THE RIGHT TO VOTE
While applying the rational basis standard to a case involving rent con-
trol regulation, the Supreme Court said that it would "not overturn [a stat-
ute that does not burden a suspect class or a fundamental interest] unless
the varying treatment of different groups or persons is so unrelated to the
achievement of any combination of legitimate purposes that we can only
conclude that the legislature's actions were irrational."29 A true-blue appli-
cation of the real rational basis standard reveals that the Court should have
concluded that the VRA's coverage formula does not violate the concept
of equal protection for each of the individual covered sovereign States.
Under a deferential treatment of the rational basis standard by the Court,
Congress need only demonstrate that the classification approach expressed
in the 2006 VRA coverage formula is rationally related to a legitimate fed-
eral interest in protecting the right to vote in those jurisdictions where the
right to vote has historically been most at risk.30
In view of the fact that the VRA's provisions are designed to serve the
legitimate purpose of protecting voters from racial discrimination in voting,
it is neither fair nor reasonable to conclude that it is irrational for the VRA
coverage formula to treat specific states differently on the basis of whether
or not they have voters who historically suffer undue burdens because of
racial discrimination.31 The VRA formula distinguishes between jurisdic-
tions because doing so advances the purpose of guaranteeing that citizens
living in those States do not again live through "irrational and arbitrary"
race-based discrimination in the election process; it would be inconsistent
28. Simon Lazarus, Stripping the Gears of National Government: Justice Stevens's Stand Against
Judicial Subversion of Progressive Laws and Lawmaking, 106 Nw. U. L. REV. 769, 820 (2012).





REJECTION OF THE RATIONAL BASIS STANDARD
to say that race discrimination in voting is a legitimate factor to be prohib-
ited but then hold that Congress may not utilize a VRA coverage formula
that has a history of serving as an effective deterrence to both the adoption
and implementation of discriminatory election laws.32 Congress need not
subject all voter legislation to preclearance or none.33 Under the rational
basis standard, Congress can select those States for preclearance coverage
in the field of voting where the need seems the greatest.34 It is conceded
that it may be difficult to identify which state or jurisdiction "causes" more
undue voter burdens because of race. 35 However, if a jurisdiction has any
voters suffering an undue burden because of racial discrimination, it is ra-
tional for Congress to take that fact into consideration under the VRA
coverage formula when establishing a preclearance standard that is "rea-
sonable under the circumstances. ' 36 The VRA's preclearance formula is
authorized under the rational basis standard because of a plausible, contin-
uing, and uneven geographical existence of voting discrimination based on
race. 37 The Fifteenth Amendment provides that the right to vote cannot be
denied because of race.38
Many briefs submitted to the Supreme Court in Shelby County con-
tained a large volume of social science evidence analyzing minorities and
voting rights, which demonstrated that the 2006 use of the coverage
formula was not outdated based on the following strategic outcomes:39 (a)
racially and ethnically divided voting to date remains considerably more
customary in covered jurisdictions than in the remainder of the nation, 0
(b) racial anger and anti-immigrant opinions are greatly more declared
with white residents in the covered jurisdictions, 41 and (c) incidents claim-
ing racial voting discrimination under Section 2 of the VRA, which may be
taken against any jurisdiction in the nation, are extremely more often made
against covered jurisdictions when compared to non-covered jurisdictions.
Even now, minority plaintiffs are conspicuously more likely to win those
cases in the covered jurisdictions as compared to non-covered jurisdic-
tions.42 Since the evidence generally demonstrates that increased rates of
32. Id.





38. U.S. CONST. amend. XV, § 1.
39. David C. Kimball, Judges Are Not Social Scientists (Yet), 12 ELECTION L.J. 324, 324 (2013);
see Shelby Cnty., Ala. v. Holder, 133 S. Ct. 2612 (2013).
40. Kimball, supra note 39, at 324 (citing Brief of Professors, Richard L. Engstrom, Theodore S.
Arrington, & David T. Canon as Amici Curiae Supporting Respondents, Shelby Cnty., Ala. v. Holder,
133 S. Ct. 2612 (2013) (No. 12-96); Stephen Ansolabehere, Nathaniel Persily, & Charles Stewart III,
Regional Differences in Racial Polarization in the 2012 Presidential Election: Implications for the Consti-
tutionality of Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act, 126 HARV. L. REV. F. 205, 211-20 (2013)).
41. Kimball, supra note 39, at 324 (citing Brief of Political Science and Law Professors as Amici
Curiae in Support of Respondents at 6-15, Shelby Cnty., Ala. v. Holder, 133 S. Ct. 2612 (2013) (No. 12-
96)).
42. Id. (citing Morgan Kousser, Gutting the Landmark Civil Rights Legislation, REUTERS, June
26, 2013, available at http://blogs.reuters.com/great-debate/2013/06/26/gutting-the-landmark-civil-rights-
2014]
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voter discrimination based on race continues as a more critical problem in
the covered jurisdictions,43 the 2006 coverage formula for identifying juris-
dictions subject to the preclearance conditions of the VRA is still needed,
and the Supreme Court should overrule its opinion as soon as possible.
One commentator has made the following remark regarding Shelby
County: "it is shocking how unimportant the majority opinion written by
Chief Justice Roberts regarded the social science evidence in the case."44 If
the majority in Shelby County had given the evidentiary record the rational
basis consideration presented in Justice Ginsberg's dissent, then it would
have held that the coverage formula authorized in 2006 is both rational and
substantial.45 Because both social science evidence and a proper interpre-
tation of the constitutional doctrine protecting the right to vote demon-
strate that the 2006 VRA coverage formula is clearly rational, the majority
in Shelby County and the Supreme Court should abandon its unreasonable
disregard of the evidentiary record and uphold the validity of the coverage
formula in Section 4.46 The unnecessary and more stringent congruent and
proportional basis review of the evidentiary record in Shelby County, as
applied by both the federal district court and a federal appeals court,
should have led the Court to the conclusion that the 2006 coverage formula
is valid under the Constitution.47
The Court's holding in Shelby County shows how Chief Justice Rob-
erts used the congruent and proportional standard to take away Congress'
autonomy by rejecting its rational means to enforce the Reconstruction
Amendments and to give the Court incredible authority to reject those
means that would have been completely acceptable under the "rational ba-
sis" standard traditionally used for legislation enforcing constitutional pro-
visions.48 Congress' factual conclusions matched up well with facts on the
ground and delivered more than enough rational information for its bipar-
tisan 2006 decision to maintain the preclearance formula for historically
covered jurisdictions in reauthorizing the VRA.4 9 In Shelby County, Chief
Justice Roberts confirmed that he and his colleagues are not opposed to
making it literally impossible for Congress to discover and rationalize facts
adequate enough to support legislation endorsing policies that a majority
of the Roberts Court simply chose to reject.50 As Justice Stevens observed,
if Congress' facts do not match the Court's preferences, the Justices will
simply go with their own "view of how things should be."51
legislation/ (accessed July 22, 2013); Brief of Ellen D. Katz for the Voting Rights Initiative as Amici
Curiae Supporting Respondents, Shelby Cnty., Ala. v. Holder, 133 S. Ct. 2612 (2013) (No. 12-96)).
43. Id.
44. Id. at 324-25.
45. Shelby Cnty., Ala. v. Holder, 133 S. Ct. 2612, 2637-38 (2013) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
46. See Kimball, supra note 39, at 325.
47. Michael James Burns, Note, Shelby County v. Holder and the Voting Rights Act: Getting the
Right Answer with the Wrong Standard, 62 CAmH. U. L. REv. 227, 229 (2012).
48. Lazarus, supra note 28, at 821.
49. Id. at 824.
50. Id. at 824-25.
51. Id.
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In Shelby County, the 2006 extension of the VRA 52 outlived a facial
constitutional challenge in the U.S. District Court for the District of Co-
lumbia and the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit
only to meet an untimely death at the hands of Chief Justice Roberts and
the four other members of the Supreme Court.53 In reaching the right con-
clusion in Shelby County, the lower courts held that the VRA was constitu-
tional by unfortunately abandoning the application of the traditional
rational basis standard of judicial review to support Congress' Fifteenth
Amendment enforcement authority.54 This implicit and unacknowledged
change in standard of review in Shelby County, from the deferential ra-
tional basis to the more demanding, fact-fixated balancing of congruent
and proportional review55 would eventually lead to the demise of the cov-
erage formula. The demise of the coverage formula prevents the Depart-
ment of Justice from adequately engaging in the litigation necessary to
remove the current burdens and current obstacles that promote voter sup-
pression. The lower courts' opinions should have been affirmed, and the
Court should overrule its own contrary holding and adopt the true rational
basis standard articulated by Justice Ginsburg in her dissenting opinion in
Shelby County.56 A rational basis review of the evidentiary record in
Shelby County demonstrates that Section 5 preclearance and its current
Section 4(b)'s coverage formula were, and continue to be, a necessary and
proper constitutional remedy because Section 2 litigation will continue to
demonstrate that it is not a very effective tool in the covered jurisdictions
to safeguard the equal rights of racial minorities as voters.
In the area of racial discrimination and voting, the Supreme Court has
historically given congressional legislation a great deal of deference. 57 The
foundation for this traditional deference is established in Section 2 of the
Fifteenth Amendment, which empowers Congress to approve any statute
that will conceivably enhance a citizen's right to vote. 8 In prior cases,
before Shelby County, the Court gave a form of rational basis deference to
Congress' reauthorization of the VRA's coverage formula by rejecting su-
perficial federalism attacks challenging the constitutionality of the law.59
Historically, by applying a rational basis standard, the Court simply refused
to accept a federalism claim hostile to the VRA because the congressional
authority to impose the Civil War Amendments on the States by applicable
legislation unavoidably supersedes doctrines of federalism.6 °
52. Id. (referring to the Fannie Lou Hamer, Rosa Parks, and Coretta Scott King Voting Rights
Act Reauthorization and Amendments Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-246, 120 Stat. 577 (2006) (codified
as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 1971, 1973 to 1973bb-1 (2006))).
53. Id.; Shelby Cnty., Ala. v. Holder, 679 F.3d 848, 853 (D.C. Cir. 2012); Shelby Cnty., Ala. v.
Holder, 811 F. Supp. 2d 424, 447-63 (D.D.C. 2011).
54. Id.
55. Id.
56. Shelby Cnty., Ala. v. Holder, 133 S. Ct. 2612, 2637-38 (2013) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
57. Paul, supra note 10, at 277.
58. Id. (citing U.S. CONST. amend. XV, § 2).
59. Id. at 278.
60. Id.
MISSISSIPPI COLLEGE LAW REVIEW
Under its rational basis standard, the Court has correctly highlighted
the fact that the Civil War Amendments were intended to develop and in-
crease federal supremacy at the expense of state sovereignty, especially in-
volving the subjects of racial discrimination and voting.6' The Court,
before Shelby County, had taken the position that voters' rights legislation
passed pursuant to Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment should be con-
sidered valid, provided that the enactment is rationally related to enforcing
the Equal Protection Clause.62 While saying the words "rational basis," the
Court has implicitly measured the constitutionality of voters' rights legisla-
tion, authorized by Congress under the Fifteenth Amendment, under an
implicit congruent and proportional test.63 Under an implicit or explicit
congruent and proportional test, the Court has afforded an abstract defer-
ence to Congress, but not enough real deference to effectively fight voter
suppression because the Court has paralyzed preclearance.64 To establish
whether congressional legislation fighting against voter discrimination sur-
vives the congruent and proportional standard, the Court inspects the evi-
dence gathered by Congress during the debates on passing and
reauthorizing the VRA.65 In the past, the Court has depended on the huge
legislative history of the VRA, covered in the committee hearings and floor
debates, to decide whether its implicit congruent and proportional standard
and pre-textual rational basis test have been met.
However, under a true application of the traditional rational basis re-
view test adopted by the Court in Williamson v. Lee Optical of Oklahoma,
Inc., the VRA coverage formula in Shelby County is valid because the
Court held that a law is constitutional provided that its hypothetical goal
can be conceived.66 When the Court requires Congress to support VRA
coverage formula legislation fighting voter discrimination, with evidence
that the formula will actually address the problem rather than that it is
conceivable that the VRA coverage formula could address the problem,
the Court abandoned the traditional rational basis standard of Lee Optical
and imposed a prototype of the congruent and proportional test.6 7 Accord-
ingly, the Court's very deferential, traditional rational basis test in Lee Op-
tical advises that the constitutionality of federal legislation is only






66. Roger V. Abbott, Is Economic Protectionism a Legitimate Governmental Interest Under Ra-
tional Basis Review?, 62 CA-H. U. L. REV. 475, 482 (2013) (citing Williamson v. Lee Optical of Okla.,
Inc., 348 U.S. 483, 487-88 (1955) (stating that the legislature, rather than the courts, should determine
the advantages and disadvantages of a law)).
67. See Williamson, 348 U.S. at 487-88.
68. McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 425-26 (1961) (holding that "[t]he constitutional safe-
guard is offended only if the classification rests on grounds wholly irrelevant to the achievement of the
State's objective .... [S]tatutory discrimination will not be set aside if any state of facts reasonably may
be conceived to justify it.") (citations omitted) (emphasis added).
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v. United States69 case is an example of the Court applying an implicit and
unacknowledged congruent and proportional standard to the VRA; the
Court indicated that Congress' reauthorization of the Act was rational be-
cause Congress had actual evidence that the political advancement by mi-
norities was limited and fairly small. However, if the City of Rome7 ° case
had applied the traditional rational basis test to the VRA, the Court would
have concluded that Congress' reauthorization of the Act was rational be-
cause it was conceivable that the political advancement by minorities could
be expanded by the existence of a coverage formula, as opposed to no cov-
erage formula at all. Under either the congruent and proportional test or
the traditional rational basis test, Chief Justice Roberts did not have any
legitimate basis to reject Congress' deliberated judgment that prohibiting
electoral changes that have a discriminatory impact, without preclearance,
is an effective method of preventing covered States from invalidating or
whitewashing the rights recently earned by African Americans.7'
In Shelby County, the Court refused to defer to Congress in the field
of racial discrimination and voting by refusing to apply either the tradi-
tional rational basis test or the congruent and proportional standard by
engaging in an extreme makeover of post-Civil War Amendment in favor
of federalism that generated Southern comfort. The Voting Rights Act of
1965 used unexpected measures to address a peculiar problem, according
to Chief Justice Roberts.72 The Section 5 mandate that specific States seek
federal permission before passing any law related to voting is not properly
considered as an extreme exodus from straightforward principles of feder-
alism for a nation truly committed to guaranteeing equal voting rights to all
of its citizens in an environment free of race discrimination. The fact that
Section 4 of the Act applied the preclearance mandate only to some states
should be recognized as a dramatic implementation of the principle that all
citizens enjoy an equal right to vote, regardless of their race, and an alleged
equal Southern sovereignty theory does not prohibit Congress from ration-
ally reducing race-based voter suppression with any plausible formula.
An outbreak of new voting suppression is due in large part to a re-
sponse to the Supreme Court ruling in Shelby County that unlocked the
door to additional restrictive changes without prior approval from the fed-
eral government.73  In 2013, the Supreme Court invalidated the
preclearance, an essential condition of the 1965 VRA. Shelby County per-
mitted a number of predominantly southern states to change their election
laws without seeking mandated consent from the Justice Department.74
Not many weeks after Shelby County, uninhibited by the mandate and en-
couraged by a Republican supermajority, North Carolina approved the
69. City of Rome v. United States, 446 U.S. 156, 181 (1980).
70. Id.
71. Id. at 178.
72. Shelby Cnty., Ala. v. Holder, 133 S. Ct. 2612, 2618 (2013).
73. Yaccino & Alvarez, New G.O.P. Bid to Limit Voting in Swing States, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 30,
2014, at Al, available at 2014 WLNR 8559867.
74. Id.
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country's most comprehensive constraints on voting rights.75 The North
Carolina law abolished same-day voter registration, while also abandoning
a popular project of pre-registering high school students to vote.76 North
Carolina reduced early voting from seventeen days to ten days, imple-
mented a strict photo identification obligation that arbitrarily excluded stu-
dent and state worker identifications, and terminated straight-ticket party
voting with all of these voter suppression tools projected to hurt Democrats
by suppressing the voting power of racial minorities and college students.77
The Supreme Court decision in Shelby County also freed Texas to es-
tablish its strict photo identification mandates to use as a voter suppression
device.78 Judge Richard Posner of the United States Court of Appeals for
the Seventh Circuit correctly wrote in 2013 that voter identification laws
should, by now, generally be interpreted as a process of voter suppression
instead of fraud prevention.79 Republican-controlled state legislatures
should take action to solve their decreasing voter base by trying to be more
inclusive and appealing to a diversity of voters.8" As an alternative to ap-
pealing to voter diversity, Republicans have chosen to disregard complete
sections of the public and then attempt to prevent them from going to the
polls, under the pretext of attacking voter fraud.8 ' The courts now possess
abundant evidence to see this Republican voter identification plot for what
it is.82 "What we see here is a total disrespect and disregard for constitu-
tional protections,"8 3 declared the Rev. William Barber, President of the
North Carolina N.A.A.C.P., who opposes North Carolina's voter suppres-
sion transformation.
Opponents of the voter suppression movement have also filed a num-
ber of federal and state lawsuits to challenge the voting suppression pro-
cess, including Justice Department lawsuits against North Carolina and
Texas.84 In Ohio, opponents of the voter suppression movement are col-
lecting signatures to place a constitutional amendment on the ballot in No-
vember 2014, which would reject some of the voting suppression actions.
85
Proposed bipartisan legislation has been introduced in Congress to address
some of the voter suppression issues that, without a reasonable doubt, were
encouraged by the Supreme Court decision concerning the VRA in Shelby
County.8 6 Democrats contend that the proposed congressional legislation
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far-reaching enough.87 A bipartisan presidential commission recently de-
livered a report endorsing an increase in online voting and extending early
voting.88 In my opinion, if this voting suppression strategy is successful for
Republicans, it means that free and fair elections in America are dead on
arrival.
III. CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS' APPLICATION OF AN EQUAL SOUTHERN
SOVEREIGNTY THEORY IN SHELBY COUNTY
SHOULD BE REJECTED
Chief Justice Roberts' equal Southern sovereignty concept contains a
fatal flaw because the word "person" as used from the perspective of the
Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment cannot, as a result of every
rational method of interpretation, be extended to include the States of the
Union, and in 1966, Chief Justice Warren said the Court's institutional
knowledge supported the conclusion that not a single court had ever
adopted the equal sovereignty theory.8 9 Unlike Chief Justice Roberts,
courts have consistently regarded the Due Process Clause of the Fifth
Amendment equal protection principle only as protections for individual
persons and private groups, not individual, sovereign southern states.90
The express goals of the Fifteenth Amendment, under the Court's past de-
cisions as well as the customary doctrines of constitutional interpretation,
completely support the following fundamental rule of law.9" "As against
the reserved powers of the States, Congress may use any rational means to
effectuate the constitutional prohibition of racial discrimination in vot-
ing."92 Although it is conceded that the States possess reserved powers
against Congress, the equal Southern sovereignty theory is not a reserved
power against Congress because the word "equality," as applied to the Due
Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment, does not logically include the
States of the Union.93
Once Chief Justice Roberts concedes in Shelby County "that voting
discrimination still exists; no one doubts that,"94 it is not logical for him to
deny Congress a plausible opportunity to reduce voter discrimination
based on a theory of equal Southern sovereignty, which lacks any support
under the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment's equal protection
principle.
The VRA disparate treatment of the states, under its preclearance
provision, continued to comply with constitutional requirements before the
Supreme Court created the unsustainable constitutional fiction of equal in-
dividual sovereignty rights in Shelby County. Shelby County's challenge to
87. Id.
88. Id.





94. Shelby Cnty., Ala. v. Holder, 133 S. Ct. 2612, 2619 (2013).
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Section 4(b) of the VRA on the ground that it unconstitutionally distin-
guishes between states, in violation of the false principle of equal sover-
eignty, was properly rejected by the federal district court in Shelby County
because equal sovereignty is not even implied in the Tenth Amendment
and Article IV of the Constitution, because Section 2 of the Fifteenth
Amendment grants Congress' power to protect the right to vote against
racial discrimination. 95
Even if one could unreasonably imagine that equal sovereignty is im-
plied in the Tenth Amendment and Article IV of the Constitution, Section
4(b) represents proper enforcement legislation because Congress' broad
power to enforce the right to vote, under Section 2 of the Fifteenth
Amendment, supersedes states' rights or her twin sister, equal sovereigns.96
Since 1966, it has been a time-honored tradition that any policy of the
equality of the States does not prohibit Congress from exercising its broad
power selectively when directing remedial legislation toward geographic ar-
eas where direct action is necessary.97 In my opinion, as an act of reverse
judicial activism, the Supreme Court made it clear in Shelby County that it
had departed from the fundamental principle of an equal right to vote for
African Americans and other racial minorities by requiring Congress to
meet a mythical equal Southern sovereignty standard before it can exercise
its authority to promote voter equality.
IV. SHELBY COUNT-'S HOLDING HAS THE PRACTICAL EFFECT OF
INVALIDATING THE PRECLEARANCE CONCEPT BY KILLING OFF THE
COVERAGE FORMULA WHICH ACTUALLY DENIES MINORITY VOTERS IN
COVERED JURISDICTIONS AN EFFECTIVE REMEDY UNDER THE VRA
The VRA was passed by Congress with a specific focus on deep-rooted
racial discrimination in voting in specified geographical locations in the
United States of America.9" Section 2 of the VRA, which prohibits any
paradigm, practice, or system that produces a denial or a reduction of the
right of any citizen to vote based on race or color, operates nationally.99
Section 2 of the VRA was not litigated in Shelby County.'00 Section 2 au-
thorizes the government, or any injured participant, to file suit against any
jurisdiction in the United States that breaches the VRA.' 1 Unlike Section
2 of the VRA, 102 Section 4 of the VRA1 °3 only applies to specified covered
95. Shelby Cnty., Ala. v. Holder, 811 F. Supp. 2d 424, 503 (D.D.C. 2011), overruled by Shelby
Cnty., Ala. v. Holder, 133 S. Ct. 2612 (2013).
96. Id.
97. Id.
98. See generally 42 U.S.C. § 1973 (2006).
99. 42 U.S.C. § 1973(a) (2006).
100. Shelby Cnty., 133 S. Ct. at 2619.
101. 42 U.S.C. § 1973(a).
102. Id.
103. 42 U.S.C § 1973b(b) (2008), available at http://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/42/1973b
(last visited Sept. 30, 2014).
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States or political subdivisions. Section 4 of the VRA established a "cover-
age formula" for deciding which jurisdiction or political subdivision needed
to be included as a "covered jurisdiction" under the law. Congress wisely
concluded that states or political subdivisions, with tests or other racially
discriminatory obstacles to voting based on low voter registration or turn-
out in the 1960s and early 1970s, were covered jurisdictions. In covered
jurisdictions, Section 5 of the VRA 10 4 requires that any proposed change in
voting procedures must be approved by either the United States District
Court for the District of Columbia or the Attorney General. The process
of seeking approval for a change in a voting law by a covered jurisdiction
from either the United States District Court for the District of Columbia or
from the Attorney General under Section 5 of the VRA is now well recog-
nized as "preclearance. '105
Shelby County, a covered jurisdiction in Alabama, filed a suit against
the Attorney General in federal district court in Washington, D.C., request-
ing a declaratory ruling that both Sections 4(b) and 5 of the VRA are
facially unconstitutional, along with a permanent injunction prohibiting
their functioning.1" 6 In Shelby County, the Supreme Court agreed with
Shelby County's challenge to the coverage formula of Section 4(b) of the
VRA and found that the provision violated the Constitution. 107 Disagree-
ment with the Court's judgment in Shelby County created instant demands
for transformation by policymakers and thought leaders."0 '
The Supreme Court, while attacking and invalidating the VRA's Sec-
tion 4 coverage formula, completely paralyzed Section 5 preclearance as an
option.109 The Court in Shelby County left safe and sound the VRA Sec-
tion 3(c) "bail-in" procedure"' or the "pocket trigger" provision." As a
mixture of Sections 2 and 5 of the VRA, the Section 3 "pocket trigger"
104. 42 U.S.C § 1973c(a) (2006), available at http://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/42/1973c (last
visited Sept. 30, 2014).
105. Id.
106. Shelby Cnty., Ala. v. Holder, 133 S. Ct. 2612, 2615 (2013).
107. Michael Ellement, Preclearance Without Statutory Change: Bail-In Suits Post-Shelby County,
32 YALE L. & POL'Y REV. INTER ALIA 1 (2013).
108. Id.
109. Id. at 2.
110. 42 U.S.C. § 1973a(c) (2006), available at http://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/42/1973a
(last visited Sept. 30, 2014) ("If in any proceeding instituted by the Attorney General or an aggrieved
person under any statute to enforce the voting guarantees of the fourteenth or fifteenth amendment in
any State or political subdivision the court finds that violations of the fourteenth or fifteenth amend-
ment justifying equitable relief have occurred within the territory of such State or political subdivision,
the court, in addition to such relief as it may grant, shall retain jurisdiction for such period as it may
deem appropriate and during such period no voting qualification or prerequisite to voting or standard,
practice, or procedure with respect to voting different from that in force or effect at the time the pro-
ceeding was commenced shall be enforced unless and until the court finds that such qualification, pre-
requisite, standard, practice, or procedure does not have the purpose and will not have the effect of
denying or abridging the right to vote on account of race or color, or in contravention of the voting
guarantees set forth in section 1973b(f)(2) of this title: Provided, That such qualification, prerequisite,
standard, practice, or procedure may be enforced if the qualification, prerequisite, standard, practice, or
procedure has been submitted by the chief legal officer or other appropriate official of such State or
subdivision to the Attorney General and the Attorney General has not interposed an objection within
sixty days after such submission, except that neither the court's finding nor the Attorney General's
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blends an enforcement lawsuit with a prophylactic remedy. Under this
blending process, Section 3 allows courts to enforce a preclearance require-
ment as a remedy for intentional violations of the Fourteenth and Fifteenth
Amendments.112 In order to require Section 3 preclearance, the court must
first conclude that intentional discrimination has occurred." 13 Next, during
the remedial phase, the district court, at its discretion, may retain jurisdic-
tion and require Section 3 preclearance.' 1 4 In the course of "bail-in" Sec-
tion 3 litigation, the local federal district court maintains jurisdiction and is
able to receive preclearance applications." 5 Therefore, a court acquainted
with the original constitutional violation decides whether prospective vot-
ing adjustments have a discriminatory purpose and effect.11 6 Regardless of
the preclearance provisions' connections, there are two significant distinc-
tions." 7 First, Section 5 was intended to serve as a temporary provision,
whereas the "bail-in" condition was permanent.' Second, the two provi-
sions possess extremely dissimilar triggers.'1 9 Portrayed by Section 4's cov-
erage formula, Section 5 involves preclearance in jurisdictions with
histories of racial discrimination in voting from the 1960s and 1970s.120
"Initiated as a [S]ection 2 suit, [S]ection 3 requires a court to find-or a
jurisdiction to admit-a constitutional violation."'
' 21
Because the VRA Section 3 procedures do not have any independent
legs and must start out as a Section 2 suit, I do not think Section 3 is likely
to be an effective alternative to a Section 5 preclearance remedy that is no
longer available because the Supreme Court invalidated the Section 4 cov-
erage formula in Shelby County.' 22 Although Section 3(c) of the VRA's
"bail-in" mechanism, or the "pocket trigger," authorizes federal courts to
expose States and political subdivisions that have violated the Fourteenth
or Fifteenth Amendments in the preclearance process, this remedial provi-
sion will not allow the DOJ and civil rights groups to effectively reestablish
the preclearance regime through litigation because of its limitations that
are very similar to those involved in VRA Section 2 ligation.123 Section 3
failure to object shall bar a subsequent action to enjoin enforcement of such qualification, prerequisite,
standard, practice, or procedure.").
111. Ellement, supra note 107, at 2 (citing Travis Crum, The Voting Rights Act's Secret Weapon:
Pocket Trigger Litigation and Dynamic Preclearance, 119 YALE L.J. 1992, 1997 (2010)).
112. Travis Crum, The Voting Rights Act's Secret Weapon: Pocket Trigger Litigation and Dynamic
Preclearance, 119 YALE L.J. 1992, 2006 (2010).
113. Id.
114. Id. at 2007.







122. Shelby Cnty., Ala. v. Holder, 133 S. Ct. 2612, 2631 (2013).
123. Crum, supra note 112, at 1997.
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of the VRA may trigger preclearance coverage in targeted pockets of ra-
cially biased voter suppression not included under Section 5's preclearance
criteria.124
Section 3's preclearance remedy is not an adequate substitute for the
loss of the Section 5 preclearance remedy because a Section 3 procedure is
only available if the plaintiff can meet the Section 2 requirements, while
Section 5 preclearance review is totally free of the Section 2 burdens.
125
From the time when the VRA was implemented, Section 2 was used as a
tool to protect voting rights in those jurisdictions not included in the Sec-
tion 5 preclearance restraint.126 Post-Shelby County, Section 2 suits are ex-
pected to develop more frequently. 127  Actually, the day after the
publication of the Court's opinion in Shelby County, a collection of plain-
tiffs filed a Section 2 suit challenging Texas' voter identification law; previ-
ously the voter identification law was the focus of Section 5 litigation.
121
Unfortunately, Section 2 has substantial drawbacks compared to Section
5's preclearance analysis. First, the burden of proof in a Section 2 suit is on
the party suing the jurisdiction. 1 9 The plaintiff must prove that the prac-
tice at issue produces a denial or an abridgement of the right to vote. 130 By
comparison, the Section 5 preclearance obligation of proof puts the burden
on the jurisdiction and compels it to defend the change.13' Because the
Section 2 standard is considerably more difficult to prove when claiming a
VRA violation, when matched against litigating Section 5 preclearance
cases,132 voting rights supporters should regrettably reject as excessively
optimistic any suggestion that Section 3 is capable of adequately satisfying
the rational basis hypocrisy created by the Court's harmful treatment of
Section 4.133
124. Id.
125. See Ellement, supra note 107, at 5.
126. Id.
127. Id.
128. Id. (citing Complaint at 1 50, Veasey v. Perry, 2:13CV00193 (S.D. Tex. June 26, 2013).
129. Id.
130. Id.; see 42 U.S.C. § 1973(a) (2006) ("No voting qualification or prerequisite to voting or stan-
dard, practice, or procedure shall be imposed or applied by any State or political subdivision in a man-
ner which results in a denial or abridgement of the right of any citizen of the United States to vote on
account of race or color, or in contravention of the guarantees set forth in section 1973b(f)(2) of this
title, as provided in subsection (b) of this section."); see also 42 U.S.C. § 1973(b) ("A violation of
subsection (a) of this section is established if, based on the totality of circumstances, it is shown that the
political processes leading to nomination or election in the State or political subdivision are not equally
open to participation by members of a class of citizens protected by subsection (a) of this section in that
its members have less opportunity than other members of the electorate to participate in the political
process and to elect representatives of their choice. The extents to which members of a protected class
have been elected to office in the State or political subdivision is one circumstance which may be con-
sidered: Provided, That nothing in this section establishes a right to have members of a protected class
elected in numbers equal to their proportion in the population.").
131. Id.; see 42 U.S.C. § 1973a(c).
132. See Ellement, supra note 107, at 5.
133. Id. at 9.
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IV. CONCLUSION
In conclusion, Justice Ginsburg correctly suggests there should not be
any reasonable doubt that the covered jurisdictions, deep in the heart of
the South, have an exceptional history of problems with racial discrimina-
tion in voting. Logical reflection on this traditional history, still in living
memory, was a rational and substantial justification for the preclearance
concept and the current formula. Of course, Congress recognized that the
history of voting discrimination would not end in 1965, and as a result,
Congress created preclearance for covered jurisdictions to begin a new tra-
dition of equal voting rights. But when the Court ignores the past, it is
often a prelude to what is to come in the future.134 In addition, "[t]hose
who cannot remember the past are condemned to repeat it."' 35 Unlike
Congress, Chief Justice Roberts in Shelby County, in the name of Southern
sovereignty, has placed the gains made in voting at risk by encouraging
backsliding in covered southern states by invalidating the coverage formula
authorized in the 2006 Reauthorization law.' 3 6 Justice Ginsburg wisely ob-
served, "Of particular importance, even after 40 years and thousands of
discriminatory changes blocked by preclearance, conditions in the covered
jurisdictions demonstrated that the formula was still justified by current
needs. "137
134. Shelby Cnty., Ala. v. Holder, 133 S. Ct. 2612, 2642 (2013) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (citing W.
SHAKESPEARE, THE TEMPEST act 2, sc. 1).
135. Id. (quoting G. SANTAYANA, THE LiFE OF REASON 284 (1905)).
136. Id.
137. Id.
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